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Abstract 
 
Nowadays, ten years on after the financial crisis, we are still, somehow, 
experiencing global financial shockwaves. Such financial instability, though not the same 
as before, affects the protection of the creditors; for, it has generated a sharp shift in public 
discourse and at the same time a wide regulatory interest, both in the U.S. federal 
bankruptcy system as well as in the laws of various jurisdictions in Europe whereby the 
debate continues on how to better address the needs of the present, on how to optimally 
design bankruptcy laws and finally on how to better shape the policies of the future. 
Resulting from the above are the various economic challenges facing both the U.S. and the 
E.U. especially in connection to creditors’ protection. As governments worldwide tackle 
the issue of optimal restructure of corporate and insolvency law,  we critically discuss the 
position in relation to the creditors’ protection under the legal regimes of USA, Germany, 




It is human nature to act in one's own interest. Though ethicists and psychologists 
may disagree about the extent to which self-interest is a motivating factor behind human 
behavior, most accept that it plays some role. Assuming that human behavior is at least in 
part a function of self-interest, laws should be expected to reflect that behavior. Many laws 
already do. However, where money is involved, the need to curb the incentive to advance 
one's own interests at the expense of another is even greater. For example, the law prohibits 
a corporate director from enriching himself at the expense of the corporation, and whilst 
other shareholders have a right to contest the decisions of the general assembly that foster 
the interest of the single shareholder - but do damage to the corporation in general, 
nevertheless, special representation of the corporation is required in case a director holds, 
at the same time the role of another counter party and so on. All these rules are actually 
mechanisms, that play a significant role in managing the conflict of interest that inevitably 
appears at some point in every corporation and should not be seen as a negative event per 
se. Rather, it is just one of the circumstances that require special rules for the sake of the 
successful management of the corporation.1  
In the insolvency law, where many stakeholders, such as the debtor itself, creditors, 
employees, insolvency administration, are involved, conflict of interest can appear at every 
step of the way, and, therefore, it is very important to ensure a level playing field among 
all these participants, ensuring them adequate means for the protections of their own 
interests. Insolvency rules gain particular importance at the time of financial crisis, when 
usually the number of insolvent companies grows. These periods usually serve as 
cornerstones of new insolvency regimes, that are usually introduced due to the specific 
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circumstances that require new ways of problem solving. One of these “cornerstones” of 
“legal insolvency history” is definitely the financial crisis that struck the whole world 
economy more than ten years ago and started a “revolution” in the existing legal 
frameworks throughout the world. This “revolution” shook the insolvency regimes of 
almost all the countries which were experiencing the financial crisis and did not stop only 
in this legal area but, unavoidably, in many case, also continued and expanded into the area 
of execution and civil law as well.2 A similar “revolution” in insolvency law happened also 
before World War I, when the number of insolvency procedures in France increased for 
240%, resulting in the exclusion of minor debtors from the solvency procedure.3 
In the modern era, though, not only the content of the insolvency law required 
significant changes, but, also, the scope of its application - in the geographical sense - 
called for significant changes, as well. The fact that the EU promulgated the unification of 
the European market and economy, together with the increase of related parties or 
corporations with international background, resulted in the fact that a need for a single 
unique rulebook for insolvency procedures started to appear, even before the financial 
crisis had hit many countries and had affected many legal regimes. Therefore, the fact that 
in 2000 the EU Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings (1346/2000) was enacted, together 
with other regulations or directives which continued to develop in the sphere of the 
insolvency law, is not something to wonder about. This trend was, however, “old news” in 
the USA, where already from 1789, via the Constitution,  it was ensured that insolvency 
matters were to be regulated on the federal level.4 
 
II. USA - The Purpose of Adequate Protection 
 
In the USA, the concept of adequate protection derives from the Fifth Amendment 
protection of property interests. Adequate protection, however, is more than a 
constitutional protection of the creditor's interest in the property. Section 361 of the US 
Bankruptcy Code (USBC) and the concept of adequate protection, are generally based as 
much on policy grounds.   
Section 361 USBC recognizes the availability of alternate means of protecting a 
secured creditor's interest. Though the creditor might not receive his bargain in kind, the 
purpose of the section is to ensure that the secured creditor receives in value essentially 
what he bargained for. The basic purpose of adequate protection is to replace the 
protections afforded to a secured creditor by a bankrupt debtor's continued possession of 
its collateral. Adequate protection payments are designed to compensate the holder of a 
secured claim for any decline in the value of its collateral, that occurs after the bankruptcy 
filing. There is no express statutory requirement that unsecured creditors be provided 
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adequate protection. The Bankruptcy Code requires a debtor to provide adequate protection 
to a secured creditor in at least three circumstances: (1) when the secured creditor seeks to 
lift the automatic stay, and the court finds that there is a lack of adequate protection; (2) 
when the debtor uses, sells, or leases a secured creditor's collateral; and (3) when the debtor 
proposes to prime a secured creditor's lien, with an additional lien. In these instances, a 
secured creditor must request that the bankruptcy court order the debtor to provide adequate 
protection of the secured creditor's interest. While the stay provisions of section 362 USBC 
require that a secured creditor's interest be adequately protected, most courts still require 
that the secured creditor actually request the relief or adequate protection prior to the court 
ordering it. The bankruptcy court may condition the continuation of the automatic stay on 
the provision of adequate protection, but the lien creditor must first "request" relief from 
the stay. Similarly, secured creditors must request adequate protection when a debtor 
intends to use, sell, or lease the secured creditor's non-cash collateral. Courts will place the 
onus of requesting adequate protection on the secured creditor. The rules are different when 
the debtor wants to use cash secured by a lender's lien, as the debtor cannot use this cash 
collateral, unless it first provides the secured creditor with adequate protection. The debtor 
does not have the right to use cash collateral without either the consent of the secured 
creditor or an order of the court.5 
 
a) Corporate Fiduciary Duties   
 
In insolvency circumstances, secured creditors are entitled to protection of their 
interests in the debtor's property. Adequate protection is a creditor's right to receive 
compensation from a debtor for any decline in the value of its collateral during a 
bankruptcy case. Courts require the debtor to provide the secured creditor with adequate 
protection while the automatic stay is in effect, while the debtor is using a secured creditor's 
collateral, or when the debtor proposes to prime a secured creditor's lien on collateral and 
creditors must come to court prepared to present sufficient evidence to secure adequate 
protection of its interests.6  
While the law of fiduciary duty is clear when applied to healthy, solvent 
corporations, its application becomes muddled when applied to financially distressed 
companies. In part, this is because a financially distressed company is a different beast than 
a solvent one. Whereas these interests are usually harmonious in a solvent corporation, 
each self-interested constituency might find itself in tension with the others when 
insolvency is looming. Consequently, as a corporation nears insolvency and finally 
becomes insolvent, the common law's emphasis on shareholder interests makes less and 
less sense. Upon insolvency, shareholders have nothing more to lose, as little equity 
remains in the company. At the same time, however, they still have everything to gain; 
although their shares are presently worthless, they retain the potential to be worth 
something, if the corporation can reverse its financial distress. A rationally self-interested 
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shareholder would favor high risk ventures to maximize the company’s value, since he 
cannot afford to lose any more money. The shareholder becomes a high stakes gambler, 
using “other people's money” – i.e. the creditors’ money, as ante. Given the limited 
downside, why not gamble with the corporation's remaining assets and try to rebuild some 
of its value? 
From the creditor's point of view, however, this is an undesirable course of action 
because shareholder risk-taking will, more likely than not, diminish the value of the 
remaining corporate assets from which the creditors must get paid. If the compnay is truly 
insolvent, then the creditors will satisfy their claims with money derived from the 
liquidation of corporate assets, with each creditor taking his share of the corporate pie. Any 
dissipation of these assets, caused by precarious ventures taken on behalf of the 
shareholders, will mean less money for the creditors. From the creditor's standpoint, 
insolvency causes the shareholder to lose his status as a residual claimant, since it is now 
the creditors who bear any risk of loss. 
Although law as applied to near-insolvent firms is unclear, it is at least clear that 
upon insolvency in fact, a duty is owed to creditors. This duty arises from the “trust fund 
doctrine,” which holds that the directors of an insolvent corporation become the trustees of 
the remaining corporate assets, of which the creditors are the beneficiaries. A fiduciary 
duty is owed to the creditors of a company that is insolvent in fact. It is still unsettled, 
however, whether this duty extends to creditors when a corporation is in a state of near-
insolvency. State courts and federal bankruptcy courts have considered the issue of 
fiduciary duties in near-insolvent companies. At one end of the spectrum, courts allow for 
the possibility of an affirmative duty to creditors. At the other extreme, courts hold that no 
real “duty” is owed to creditors of near-insolvent companies.7 It is supported that the idea 
that creditors are the beneficiaries of fiduciary duties in near-insolvency is not a valid one 
and that directors of near-insolvent companies need not consider creditor interests, for, 
their duty is really owed to the corporation itself.8 Fiduciary duties are context-specific, for 
they shift to new beneficiaries as the financial status of the corporation changes.9 
 
a) The Road from Solvency to Bankruptcy  
 
 The courts have defined four major financial conditions a company may 
experience as it deteriorates from solvency to bankruptcy.' In the first condition, the 
company is solvent where its current assets exceed its current liabilities. A solvent 
company should have cash reserves, annual surpluses, minimal levels of debt, and the 
ability to invest in its future operations. The second condition, that of the zone of 
insolvency, includes a financially distressed company with deteriorating fiscal conditions, 
such as minimal cash reserves, only marginal surpluses, increasing debt, and an inability 
to invest in future operations. In the third condition, that of insolvency, the worsening of 
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the company's economic condition, causes the company to become insolvent, as 
determined by the Bankruptcy Code or by case law. In the fourth condition, that of 
bankruptcy, the company either voluntarily files for bankruptcy or is involuntarily pulled 
into bankruptcy by its creditors. To address standards applicable in a particular jurisdiction, 
counsels should examine the laws of the specific jurisdiction involved because questions 
of director and officer liability and other corporate affairs are determined under the laws of 
jurisdiction of incorporation.  
 The zone of insolvency and bankruptcy conditions are particularly litigious, 
because the potential financial losses during these periods are especially large. The 2007-
2009 recession in the U.S. produced extremely high degrees of these two conditions. The 
lack of an unambiguous, legal, and operational definition permits creditors, shareholders, 
courts, and other parties to unreliably, unpredictably, and inconsistently classify companies 
as operating in the zone of insolvency. The problem posed by the zone of insolvency, needs 
to be addressed, in order to resolve uncertainty in the law, redefine fuzzy and ambiguous 
standards, specify the scope of the zone, and provide guidance to directors and officers.10 
 
b) Zone of Insolvency 
  
 Zone of insolvency is a financial condition that exists for a company during an 
indeterminate period between its solvency and insolvency. A great obstacle for corporate 
investors and creditors  - as to the understanding the duties they are owed by directors and 
officers - is created by the judicial finding that the zone of insolvency is less objectively 
determinable than insolvency. The zone of insolvency does not have a generally accepted 
definition and the judiciary provides only limited guidance as to its definitional scope. It 
has been suggested that a company is in the zone of insolvency if the company has 
"unreasonably small capital," which is "a condition of financial debility short of insolvency 
but which makes insolvency reasonably foreseeable."  
 In insolvency, the fiduciary duties of directors and officers extend to a company's 
creditors, even as the duties continue to be owed to the corporation. The courts are divided 
on the issue of whether directors' and officers' duties to shareholders completely terminate 
at corporate insolvency. Some courts adopt a view that when the corporation becomes 
insolvent, directors and officers no longer represent the shareholders, but the creditors. 
However, other courts have stated that the directors' and officers' duties extend to creditors 
and become primary, while the duties to shareholders remain, but become secondary in 
nature. The logic for this second position is that an insolvent corporation's shareholders are 
“last in line” for repayment and there is no repayment for the shareholders until the 
creditors have been paid.  
 There are five general tests, which are being used to determine if the company is 
insolvent: a) under the equity test, the company is considered insolvent when it is unable 
to pay its debts as they come due in the ordinary course of business.  A company is 
insolvent in the equity sense if its assets lack short-term liquidity; b) under the balance 
sheet test, the company is insolvent when its assets are below its liabilities with no 
reasonable prospect that the business can successfully be continued; c) under the future 
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operations test, the company's capital is evaluated in terms of its ability to support financing 
of its future operations; d) under the insolvency in fact test, a company is insolvent when 
it has liabilities in excess of the reasonable market value of assets held. This fourth test is 
considered to adopt a broad view of insolvency, under which almost any start-up company 
may be considered insolvent; e) under the bankruptcy test, a corporation is insolvent when 
its debts exceed the fair value of its property.11 This variety of tests creates additional 
uncertainty for a court, since any test can potentially be used to determine if the company 
is insolvent, however, generally speaking, there are three tests to determine if a company 
is solvent, and courts usually employ either the balance sheet, or the cash flow, or the thin 
capital tests, in order to determine the company's solvency. The variety of tests and lack of 
definitional or pro-forma appropriateness of each test adds to the uncertainty of litigants, 
because parties know that the evaluation of the company's financial position is partially 
dependent on the specific test or tests a court chooses to employ.  
 The extension of a director's fiduciary duties to creditors is granted through a trust 
fund doctrine. Although the fiduciary duties of directors and officers extend to creditors 
when the company is in insolvency, the duties of loyalty and care remain the same and the 
rules of corporate governance continue to apply. In addition, courts have recognized 
supplemental fiduciary duties that directors and officers owe to creditors while the 
corporation is insolvent. The rationale for expanding fiduciary duties to creditors during 
the insolvency, is that creditors bear the brunt of damages for the conduct of directors and 
officers, as contrasted to shareholders who have theoretically lost their investment.  The 
extension of fiduciary duty to creditors is also justified by the difference of investment risk 
between shareholders and creditors. The shareholders invest by buying stock, with hopes 
that the corporation will generate profit and increase the value of the shareholder's 
investment, while the creditors lend money to the corporation with hope that they will 
recover their money with interest. During insolvency, directors and officers must be 
concerned about another variant of the breach of fiduciary duties, known as the theory of 




  A lot of legal systems have held as example the famous Chapter 11 USBC 1978, 
including the German Law on Bankruptcy of 1994 and the Greek Bankruptcy Code (GBC) 
of 2007. In the USA, the procedure under Chapter 11 USBC is not a pre-bankruptcy 
procedure, but actually a bankruptcy procedure per se, however not leading to liquidation 
but to the salvage of the company, through its reorganization.13 As soon as the filing for 
the procedure under Chapter 11 USBC takes place, the company is protected from any 
claims from creditors as there is a guaranteed automatic stay14 and the company has 120 
days (possible to be extended by courts – if needed – to 18 months) to propose a 
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reorganization scheme. This serves also as a form of pressure for the creditors to agree to 
the reorganization of the company. In addition, and in order to protect the fame of the 
company, as long as the procedure under Chapter 11 USBC takes place, the same corporate 
administration is maintained. It is also central, that any plan for reorganization is approved 
by court.15 
 When a company files for the Chapter 11 USBC bankruptcy protection, corporate 
directors and officers owe fiduciary duties to the corporation, creditors, and shareholders. 
The corporation also experiences a significant change in its governance and business 
relations, as creditors become active participants in all corporate affairs, negotiations, and 
reorganization processes. In the realm of the Chapter 11 USBC proceedings, directors and 
officers continue to operate the business and manage assets as a debtor in possession (DIP), 
where the DIP is a trustee in the position of a fiduciary with rights and powers of the 
Chapter 11 USBC trustee. As debtors in possession, the directors' and officers' duty of care 
are to maximize and protect the estate's assets, abstain from wasting assets, furnish 
information about the estate and its administration, and exercise reasonable diligence and 
care in formulating a reorganization plan. The directors' and officers' duty of loyalty in 
Chapter 11 USBC proceedings, is identical to the duty they owe when the corporation is 
solvent. The duty of loyalty requires directors and officers to refrain from self-dealing, to 
avoid conflicts of interest and the appearance of impropriety, and to treat all parties to the 
case fairly.16  
 
 
III.   The Position in Germany 
 
Germany's system of corporate governance differs from the U.S. both structurally 
and substantively.  Structurally, German companies are required to adopt a two-tier board 
of directors in an attempt to protect shareholder interests. Additionally, Germany's system 
of co-determination requires employee representation on the upper-tier supervisory board, 
making German boards much larger than boards of comparable companies in the USA. 
Substantively, Germany operates under the stakeholder model, where directors manage the 
firm on behalf of shareholders, employees, and the larger community. Also, German banks 
play a more central role in corporate governance than their counterparts in the USA.  
 
a) Director Duties under Germany's Corporate Governance System 
  
       German law requires corporations to adopt a two-tier, hierarchical board structure. 
Shareholders and employees elect members of the supervisory board. The supervisory 
board appoints and oversees the management board. In turn, the management board 
conducts the affairs of the corporation.  
A German cultural norm suggests that management should give each corporate 
constituent's interests equal weight in decision-making. However, in practice, management 
often aligns with banks and other powerful shareholders.  
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German law allows only the board to bring a lawsuit on behalf of the corporation. 
Additionally, lawsuits challenging actions of the management board or against directors 
individually may only be brought by the supervisory board. Thus, unlike the US system, 
shareholders of German corporation's typically do not bring derivative actions challenging 
director action. Moreover, the supervisory board faces disincentives to bring litigation 
against the management board since the corresponding allegations often question the 
supervisory board's performance.17 
 
b) The Parameters of the Zone of Insolvency in Germany 
 
       The parameters of the zone of insolvency under German law are amorphous and 
difficult to define.  Like the judicial decisions in the USA, legal rules in Germany attempt 
to delineate situations where a corporation is approaching insolvency prior to the initiation 
of insolvency proceedings. Accordingly, German law lists three distinct situations where a 
corporation is considered approaching insolvency. First, German law treats a company that 
experienced substantial annual losses as approaching insolvency.  The threshold of losses 
under this test is equal to one-half the share of capital on the annual balance sheet.  
Secondly, a corporation may be approaching insolvency when it is unable to make 
payments when payments are due.  And, finally, over-indebtedness is an indication that a 
corporation is approaching insolvency as well.  
German law addresses the agency cost problems encountered in the zone of 
insolvency by providing creditors additional corporate governance protections when a 
company approaches insolvency.  These corporate governance protections can be 
organized into two categories.  First, legal rules impose specific duties on directors as a 
company approaches insolvency.  Second, directors are personally liable to creditors for 
failure to discharge the duties created in the zone of insolvency.18  
 
c) Director Duties as Corporation Approaches Insolvency 
 
       When each of the statutory conditions defining “approaching insolvency” are met, 
German law imposes specific duties on directors.  
       The Aktiengesetz, the German Stock Corporation Act, requires management to initiate 
insolvency proceedings without undue delay. Although undue delay is not defined, 
insolvency proceedings must be initiated within three weeks after the corporation becomes 
over-indebted or unable to make payments when due. This duty to initiate insolvency 
proceedings protects creditors in several ways. First, it prevents directors from gambling 
with corporate assets by undertaking risky investments when the company is nearing 
insolvency. Second, it provides notice to existing and potential creditors of the company's 
financial distress. Third, by initiating insolvency proceedings quickly, it preserves the 
priority of payment established by the insolvency regime, preventing payments to preferred 
creditors. Once a corporation experiences losses equal to half of the share of capital on the 
annual balance sheet, the management board must call a shareholders meeting. At the 
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meeting, management must provide the shareholders with notice of the corporation's 
financial distress. This duty to call a shareholders meeting provides protection to both 
shareholders and creditors by providing prompt notice of the company's financial distress. 
Although primarily aimed at notifying shareholders, creditors will benefit as well, since 
many banks are also shareholders.19 
 
d) Directors' Personal Liability to Creditors for Failure to Discharge these Duties 
 
In addition to imposing specific duties on directors, once a corporation enters the 
zone of insolvency, German law provides additional creditor protection through director 
liability.  Directors can be found personally liable to creditors, for failure to discharge 
statutory duties and for failure to adhere to capital maintenance rules.  
Creditors may pursue personal liability claims against directors only when the 
creditor cannot recover from the corporation itself. German law allows creditors to recover 
personally from directors who violate certain enumerated duties.  Section 93(3) of the 
Aktiengesetz lists nine situations through which creditors may asset claims against 
directors.  In financially distressed companies, creditors can pursue directors for, inter alia, 
repayment of contributions to shareholders, payment of interest or dividends to 
shareholders, distributing assets of the company, making payments once the company is 
over-indebted, and extending additional credit. However, the code specifies that directors 
are only liable to creditors under a gross negligence standard. In addition to the situations 
enumerated in section 93(3) of the Aktiengesetz, creditors may bring claims against 
directors for gross violations of the duty of care. Directors are subject to personal liability 
to creditors for failure to adhere to capital maintenance rules at any time. Although director 
liability, under this provision, is irrespective of whether the corporation is in the zone of 
insolvency, as a practical matter, creditors are not encouraged to bring a claim against a 
director under this provision unless the company is in financial distress. Directors face per 
se liability to creditors under this provision.20 
 
e) The Pre-Bankruptcy Scheme under German Law 
 
In Germany, the law offering the option to file for pre-bankruptcy reorganization 
was introduced on 01.03.2012.21 The law offered a “shield procedure” 
(“Schutzschirmverfahren”) which allows companies which are in a state of being close to 
stay of payments or over-debt to seek the suspension of any enforcement for up to three 
months,  a period during which a reorganization plan needs be drafted and judicially 
approved. The procedure has as positive features the fact that the reorganization plan is 
secured and promoted as a procedure in itself, through practices such as the “debt for equity 
swap”; the fact that the debtor has the option to be the administrator of the assets under 
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bankruptcy; and also the fact that the creditors can appoint a bankruptcy administrator of 
their choice to administer the process and advise in the best possible way for the 
reorganization of the company.22  
 
 
IV. The Position in Greece 
 
 In Greece, despite an overwhelming legislative action both in the field of 
company and in insolvency law, and although the Greek jurisprudence has dealt 
extensively with various protection mechanisms towards the corporate creditors, there was 
none generalized theoretical reflection observed, such as those which occurred in other 
jurisdictions. However, this does not apply as far as the insolvency law legislator is 
concerned, for he explicitly established the liability regime of the directors of capital 
companies for either triggering the bankruptcy process or for the late filing of the 
application for a declaration of bankruptcy. The relevant provisions (articles 96-98, 
101,109,123,170 of the Greek Insolvency Code, (GIC)) rests on bankruptcy law, however 
it is also closely associated with company law. The above suggest the need to reassess the 
effectiveness of Greek law regarding creditors protection as this is being promulgated via  
the two main pillars of corporate and insolvency law. 
 The protection of corporate creditors is sought primarily in the case of capital 
companies, where the principle of separation, the subsequent lack of accountability of 
partners for corporate obligations towards third parties, as well as against the company, 
and the lack of involvement of creditors in the management of the company, constitutes 
the latter third parties as a vulnerable group, bearing the business risk of the company 
without at the same time being involved in the control mechanism and in the attribution of 
company benefits.23  
 Unlike corporate law, insolvency law puts first the protection of creditors. Article 
1 GIC proclaims as its primary purpose the collective satisfaction of the creditors of the 
debtor. Through the GIC and the provisions on the consolidation of business the purpose 
of the fullest satisfaction of creditors is sought to be served. The insolvency process is 
legally transcribed, so as to be effected in such a way so as to effectively meet the 
bankruptcy requirements, and preserve the categorized equality of creditors. The main 
mechanism of protection of creditors in insolvency law is that of the dissolving of the 
company. With regard to the legal entities, the protection of creditors is even greater, since 
the insolvent entity is being dissolved as per article 96 GIC and accordingly ceases to be 
operative and obtains the aim to be liquidated. The protection of creditors is being 
complemented by the introduction of regimes of civil or criminal liability, which apply to 
shareholders or directors of capital companies (articles 98, 171, 172, 176 GIC). A 
prerequisite which should exist, so that the protection mechanisms of insolvency law be 
applied to the creditors for their protection, is the declaration of the company as insolvent, 
an act which is being deterred from happening as per company law provisions. Hence, and 
in contrast with the company law provisions which offer an ex ante protection for the 
                                                 
22 A. Rokas, Pre-Bankruptcy Procedure of Reorganisation of Companies, Sakoulas, 2014, p. 40. 
23 R. Giovannopoulos, Creditors Protection in Company and Insolvency Law. Comparative Remarks, 18th 
Greek Commercial Lawyers, Association Conference, Kastoria 2008; U. Ηaas, Reform des 
gesellschaftsrechtlichen Gläubigerschutzes, (Gutachten E zum 66. Deutschen Juristentag), (2006), E 15. 
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creditors, insolvency law provides a posteriori (ex post) protection to corporate creditors. 
The interaction of company and insolvency law, as far as creditors’ protection is concerned, 
is obvious, as already demonstrated. The Greek legislator, via the enactment of article 98 
GIC and having already adopted foreign standards, included, for the first time in the 
bankruptcy legislation, the concept of the actual external accountability of the company 
directors, for the benefit and protection of corporate creditors, both in the case of dilatory 
bankruptcy and also in the case of the actual occurrence of bankruptcy. In terms of article 
98 GIC, there are also particular harmonization issues with regards to the external 
responsibility of company directors towards corporate creditors before the actual 
declaration of bankruptcy, since the actual liability regime as per article 98 GIC is activated 
only after the company has been declared as bankrupt.24  
 
 
a)  The Regime for Creditor Protection: The First Phase of the Reform  
 
In 2015, Greece introduced Law 4336/201525 so as to ratify the Financial 
Assistance Facility Agreement which had been effected with the European Stability 
Mechanism (ESM), which included, inter alia, amendments to the restructuring and 
insolvency law. These amendments were to a large extent in line with the “Restructuring 
Recommendation” (RR) of the European Commission, which was issued in 2014 and 
which was pushing towards harmonization,26 with respect to the Member States’ 
restructuring regimes. The most remarkable amendments thereof, were the following: a) 
pursuant to Article 31 par. 1 and 2 GIC, as amended, the initiation of a bankruptcy 
proceeding may no longer be seen as a reason to terminate an ongoing contract by virtue 
of an ipso facto contractual clause. A special treatment is introduced for ongoing financial 
contracts, contemplating the provision of banking, security and investment services, which 
are excluded from the above rule; and, therefore, can be automatically terminated or 
amended, due to the bankruptcy of a debtor, to the extent this has been agreed upon and 
provided by virtue of a relevant clause in force, prior to the declaration of its bankruptcy; 
b) articles 93 et seq. GIC, as amended, provide for the shortening of the regular bankruptcy 
proceedings making them more efficient by setting stricter timeframes for completion of 
various stages thereof. In particular, creditors have only one month from the declaration of 
bankruptcy (reduced from three months previously) to announce their claims, while the 
bankruptcy administrator, who is called “syndic”, must verify them as a general rule within 
a month (reduced from three months previously) with the option to extend the timeframe 
up to three months. On the other hand, a new deadline of ten days from the judicial 
verification of the claims is set for the filing of objections before the bankruptcy court27; c) 
with regards to the rehabilitation procedure of Article 99 et seq. GIC, new criteria are being 
set regarding the opening of the proceedings, hence, rehabilitation proceedings can be 
initiated, when actual inability of the debtor to meet its obligations, as they fall due, is yet 
                                                 
24 R. Giovannopoulos, Creditors Protection in Company and Insolvency Law. Comparative Remarks, 18th 
Greek Commercial Lawyers, Association Conference, Kastoria 2008.  
25 Law 4336/2015 (FEK A 94/14-08-15). 
26 C (2014) 1500 final, Brussels 12.3.2014. 
27 S. Frastanlis, Recent Reform of Greek Restructuring and Insolvency Law, International Corporate Rescue, 
(2016), Volume 13, Issue 2, 124-127, 124. 
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not present, but there is a likelihood of the debtor become insolvent and the competent 
court considers that its insolvency could be avoided through the recovery procedure.28 The 
amendment is in line with the RR of the European Commission, which aims at giving 
financially distressed companies the opportunity to enter into a restructuring at an early 
stage.29 Furthermore, the overall duration for negotiating and concluding a rehabilitation 
agreement has been extended to a more realistic period of four months, with the possibility 
of extending it further up to twelve months, provided that certain conditions are met. The 
previously valid provision of Article 100 par. 5 GIC regarding the obligation to pay a fee 
up to EUR 7,000 as an amount to cover various procedural costs, i.e. costs of professionals 
involved in the proceeding, has been abolished.30 Pursuant to Article 103 par. 1a GIC, a 
stay of individual creditor enforcement action may be automatically granted by the 
bankruptcy court, under the condition that creditors representing at least 30% of the total 
value of the outstanding claims against the debtor, including 20% of the secured claims, 
proceed to a formal statement to the bankruptcy court, that they participate in the 
negotiations for the conclusion of a rehabilitation agreement. A renewal could be available 
only on the debtor providing evidence of progress in the negotiations and subject to a 
maximum total duration of twelve months. An automatic stay, suspending the right of the 
creditors to enforce a claim against the debtor can be granted in case an agreement has 
already been reached with the requested majority of the creditors and has been brought to 
the bankruptcy court solely for ratification (“pre-packed agreement”).31 
 
 
b) Changes in the Greek Restructuring Law   
 
 
Following the RR of the European Commission issued in 201432, in 2016 Greece 
introduced Law 4446/2016,33 in an effort to have in place key principles on all types of 
insolvency proceedings, in order to improve their quality and to efficiently tackle the 
accumulation of non-performing loans of ailing debtors.34 
Pursuant to Article 99 par. 1 of the GIC as amended, the initiation of rehabilitation 
proceedings to negotiate an agreement with creditors following a formal court order was 
no longer an option and debtors need to commence restructuring negotiations at an early 
stage and without obtaining a relevant court order, with a view to reaching an out-of-court 
                                                 
28 S. Frastanlis, Recent Reform of Greek Restructuring and Insolvency Law, International Corporate Rescue, 
(2016), Volume 13, Issue 2, 124-127, 125. 
29 K. van Zwieten, Restructuring law: recommendations from the European Commission, (2014) EBRD, Law 
in transition online, pp. 2 et seq.; S. Frastanlis, Recent Reform of Greek Restructuring and Insolvency Law, 
International Corporate Rescue, (2016), Volume 13, Issue 2, 124-127, 125. 
30 S. Frastanlis, Recent Reform of Greek Restructuring and Insolvency Law, International Corporate Rescue, 
(2016), Volume 13, Issue 2, 124-127, 126. 
31 H. Eidenmüller/K. van Zwieten, Restructuring the European Business Enterprise: The EU Commission 
Recommendation on a New Approach to Business Failure and Insolvency, (September 2015) Working Paper 
No. 301/2015, pp. 13 et seq; S. Frastanlis, Recent Reform of Greek Restructuring and Insolvency Law, 
International Corporate Rescue, (2016), Volume 13, Issue 2, 124-127, 125, 127. 
32 C (2014) 1500 final, Brussels 12.3.2014. 
33 Law 4446/2016 (Government Gazette Issue n. 240/Bulletin A’/22.12.2016. 
34 S. Frastanlis, Pushing Towards Efficiency: New Changes in Greek Restructuring and Insolvency Law, 
International Corporate Rescue, (2017), Volume 14, Issue 4, 281-284, 281. 
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agreement with the requested majority of its creditors.35 Pursuant to Article 106a GIC, a 
stay suspending the right of the creditors to enforce claims against the debtor, is to be 
granted in the out-of-court negotiation period, i.e. prior to the submission of the agreement 
to the court for ratification, on the condition that creditors, representing at least 20% of the 
total value of the outstanding claims, will issue a written statement that they participate in 
the negotiations for the conclusion of a rehabilitation agreement. Pursuant to Article 100 
par. 1 GIC, a rehabilitation agreement may be drafted and submitted to the Court for 
ratification only by the creditors, without any participation of the debtor, provided that the 
latter has ceased payments and the required majority of 60% of the creditors’ claims, 40% 
of which should be secured, has been met.36  
 
c) Changes in the Greek Insolvency Law   
 
With regards to the opening of insolvency proceedings, as per article 3 GIC, except 
where the debtor has ceased payments or a cessation of payments is imminent, insolvency 
proceedings can be initiated when there is a likelihood of the debtor becoming insolvent 
and the latter submits to the Court, along with the petition for bankruptcy, a plan to re-
organize its business as per Article 107 seq. GIC.37  
To improve the efficiency of the insolvency proceedings and the restructuring 
option of the reorganization plan included therein (Article 107 seq. GIC), the legislator 
proceeded to various changes with a view to a more flexible and quick procedure. In 
particular, the involvement of the Court in the process was confined to the extent necessary 
and proportionate, i.e. Article 114 GIC providing for the Court’s competence to pre-
examine a submitted reorganization plan has been abolished as well as the ‘creditors’ 
committee’, an optional supervisory progress board. Finally, the legislator provided for the 
shortening of the insolvency proceedings by making the timeframes for completion of 
various stages thereof even stricter.38 
 
 
V.  The Position in Croatia 
 
Croatia undertook the German “Insolvenzordnung” as the role model for the 
                                                 
35 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on preventive restructuring 
frameworks, second chance and measures to increase the efficiency of restructuring, insolvency and 
discharge procedures and amending Directive 2012/30/EU, COM(2016) 723 final, 22.11.2016, p. 28 (18); 
H. Eidenmüller/K. van Zwieten, Restructuring the European Business Enterprise: The EU Commission 
Recommendation on a New Approach to Business Failure and Insolvency, (September 2015) Working Paper 
No. 301/2015, p. 13. 
36 S. Frastanlis, Pushing Towards Efficiency: New Changes in Greek Restructuring and Insolvency Law, 
International Corporate Rescue, (2017), Volume 14, Issue 4, 281-284, 281-283. 
37 H. Eidenmüller, Reformperspektiven im Restrukturierungsrecht, 31 Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht (2010), 
649, 650; S. Frastanlis, Pushing Towards Efficiency: New Changes in Greek Restructuring and Insolvency 
Law, International Corporate Rescue, (2017), Volume 14, Issue 4, 281-284, 282-283. 
38 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on preventive restructuring 
frameworks, second chance and measures to increase the efficiency of restructuring, insolvency and 
discharge procedures and amending Directive 2012/30/EU, COM(2016) 723 final, 22.11.2016, p. 25 (4); S. 
Frastanlis, Pushing Towards Efficiency: New Changes in Greek Restructuring and Insolvency Law, 
International Corporate Rescue, (2017), Volume 14, Issue 4, 281-284, 284. 
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reformation of its insolvency law in the late nineties,39 as it was the case with so many 
other Croatian laws that were inspired by German and Austrian legal acts. This custom can 
be even better understood, when taking into account the fact that Croatia was once a part 
of Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and therefore its legal tradition is historically linked to the 
ones of its western neighbors. When mentioning neighbors, the Slovenian model of Pre-
Bankruptcy Procedure that aimed for the reorganization of the indebted company inspired 
the Croatian legislator to introduce a similar model in Croatia, enacted by the Law on 
financial transactions and pre-bankruptcy settlement in 2012 (ZFPPN 2012).40 
 Although the intentions of the legislator were good, in practice this law gained a lot 
of negative publicity that culminated in statements which were claiming that it fostered 
corruption and misused company losses for the sake of certain individuals, who in that 
manner obtained a legal mean as to how to strip companies from their assets. The reason 
for this negative criticism was mainly the fact that according to the legal provisions of 
ZFPPN 2012, the whole procedure was conducted before the Financial Agency/FINA 
[Financijska agencija],41 a state entity that serves as a payment agent and employs civil 
servants and not judges that are trained for this kind of procedures. However, this solution 
was enhanced by the rule that the pre-bankruptcy proceeding that culminated in the signing 
of the pre-bankruptcy settlement was to be finalized at the Commercial court, whereby a 
final stage of the procedure, namely the signing of the pre-bankruptcy settlement would 
take place and ensure the legal effects of the court order for the pre-bankruptcy settlement.  
 Undoubtedly, the aims of the legislator might have been well intended, as he 
probably wanted to save the courts from the overload of insolvency cases and speed up the 
process of corporate rescue from bankruptcy.42 However, the reality was that in practice 
the very complicated issues concerning debts and recovery plans were solved by the civil 
servants of the the Financial Agency, who were not specialized personnel as they had no 
relevant education or experience for this kind of cases. Furthermore, the existing legal 
framework that posed most of the responsibility on the debtor when determining the list of 
creditors and debts, brought the negative effect that debtors would conspire with related 
parties or significant creditors and all of the sudden new creditors with huge debts would 
appear and overtake the guidance of the pre-bankruptcy procedure, to the damage of other 
creditors and/or the indebted company as well.43 All of this negative trend has culminated 
in the case of one famous Croatian company that underwent this procedure and was about 
to cease the pre-bankruptcy settlement before the Commercial court in Zagreb. The judge 
that was appointed to this case however refused to sign the decision that would grant the 
legal effects of the court order to this document, claiming that the whole procedure and the 
                                                 
39 Ž. Bartulović; D. Bodul; A. Vuković, Legal history and comparative review of the development of 
bankruptcy proceeding [Pravnopovijesni i poredbenopravni prikaz razvoja stečajnog postupka], Zbornik 
Pravnog fakulteta Sveučilišta u Rijeci, Vol. 34, No. 2, 2013, p. 934. 
40 D. Bodul; A. Vuković, (Another) Bankruptcy Legislation reform - functionalization of bankruptcy legal 
protection or placebo effect? [(Još jedna) reforma stečajnog zakonodavstva – funkcionalizacija stečajno 
pravne zaštite ili placebo efekt?], Zbornik Pravnog fakulteta Sveučilišta u Rijeci, Vol. 36, No. 1, 2015, p.  
186-187. 
41 Official site available at https://www.fina.hr,  <accessed July 7, 2019>. 
42 M. Dika, The procedure of Concluding the Pre-Bankruptcy Settlement [Postupak sklapanja predstečajne 
nagodbe], available at the site of Higher Commercial Court of Croatia at https://www.vts.hr, p.1. <accessed 
July 7, 2019>. 
43 J. Garašić, Most important novelties in Bankruptcy Act of 2015 [Najznačajnije novine Stečajnog zakona 
iz 2015. godine], Zbornik Pravnog fakulteta Sveučilišta u Rijeci, Vol. 38, No. 1, 2017, p. 142.  
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legal provisions that it was based on, were unconstitutional. He even went that far to file a 
constitutional claim against the ZFPPN 2012, but his claim was dismissed and the 
aforementioned case was simply appointed to another judge. However, this particular judge 
was not disheartened from this course of action and continued to adjudicate in a similar 
way when dealing with other legal cases, even when they did not enter the sphere of his 
legal expertise.44  
 Although the afore mentioned constitutional claim against ZFPPN 2012 was 
dismissed, it led to the law being significantly changed via a big reform of the Croatian 
Insolvency Act in 2015 (InsA 2015). This reform transposed the whole pre-bankruptcy 
procedure from ZFPPN 2012 to InsA 2015 which continued to serve as a unique source of 
the Croatian insolvency law for corporations. Purely formally, the reform and the changes 
it brought are to be seen in a positive light, because it helped assemble and codify all 
relevant provisions - which up until then were scattered in several pieces of legislation – in 
one law and in this way enhanced legal certainty and made the procedure practically 
speaking easier, for all parties concerned. 
 
a) The Pre-Bankruptcy Phase 
 
Whereas the bankruptcy phase usually ends with the liquidation of the company, 
the aim of the pre-bankruptcy procedure is to save the company from collapsing via the 
reorganization and financial restructuring. However, and in order to do this successfully, it 
is very important to recognize the existence of this phase early on and start the necessary 
recovery mechanisms in time.45 Therefore, in Croatia, many companies started to foster 
their controlling departments, that can use certain methods, in order to predict and avoid 
financial difficulties, such as budget of income, comparison with competition, SWOT 
analyses etc.46  
 The pre-bankruptcy procedure in Croatia is to be initiated when a corporation is 
unable to make payments, at the time point that such payments are due. The procedure is 
no longer conducted by FINA, but as per the InsA 2015, it is to be administered by the 
competent commercial court. The role of this court is to determine if the company is unable 
to meet its obligations in due course, and the whole court procedure is led by a single judge. 
This procedure is characterized through several basic legal principles that follow different 
legal provisions throughout the whole procedure. The first of these principles is the 
voluntary nature of the pre-bankruptcy settlement, which is concluded only when the 
debtor and sufficient number of creditors agree on it. The principle of equal treatment 
ensures that the debtor treats the creditors of the same sort in the same way and, hence, it 
is prohibited for the debtor to undertake any sort of actions that could lead to the unequal 
treatment and classification of the same sort of creditors. The general principle of bona 
fidae is stressed out in this procedure as well, since it is prohibited both for the creditors 
and for the debtor to undertake actions that could cause financial distress and further 
                                                 
44 More details on this matter can be found at https://www.index.hr/vijesti/clanak/tko-je-mislav-kolakusic-
najvece-iznenadjenje-ovih-izbora/2088504.aspx.  <accessed July 7, 2019>. 
45 A. Vuković, How timely initiation of bankruptcy proceedings can contribute to the improvement of 
conditions criteria of efficiency? [Kako pravovremeno pokretanje stečajnog postupka može doprinijeti 
poboljšanju njegove efikasnosti?], Zbornik Ekonomskog fakulteta u Zagrebu, Vol. 14, No. 2, 2016, p. 144. 
46 E. Priskić; L. Bačić, Bankruptcy as a Function of Company Revitalisation [Stečaj u funkciji revitalizacije 
trgovačkog društva], Učenje za poduzetništvo, Vol. 2, No. 2, 2012, p. 357. 
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damage. Finally, the principle of access to information, ensures that the debtor is required 
to enable other stakeholders to get any relevant information and documents that are 
important with regards to its financial restructuring.47 
 
b) The Bankruptcy Phase 
 
Whereas the procedure conducted in the pre-bankruptcy phase aims for the 
recovery of the financially troubled company, in the bankruptcy phase this recovery seems 
highly unlikely and the goals of the procedure are to wind up the remaining business of the 
company, cash in as much of the property as possible, and pay out the outstanding debts  
without damaging the interestes of the involved stakeholders, if possible. 
Under Croatian law, similar to the German law, one can initiate a bankruptcy 
procedure when either of the follwoing two possible reasons are met, i.e. over indebtedness 
or inability to make payments when such payments are due.  The group of people entitled 
to initiate this procedure is wide and it includes the debtor himself, its managers or 
executive directors and the members of the supervisory board, in case tthe managers are 
not in place to initiate the procedure, as well as the owners who can initiate the procedure 
in case the company has no longer appointed directors. Beside the creditors, the FINA is 
also entitled to start a bankruptcy procedure. This role of the FINA is related to its role of 
the payment agent in charge of the withdrawal of monetary means in the execution 
procedure. When there is no money on the account of the debtor and an execution title 
stays unpaid for more than 120 days, the FINA has to start a bankruptcy procedure against 
the debtor. In this way the FINA, even if not leading the procedure itself, continues to play 
a significant role in the whole process. Furthermore, the sale of real estate of the debtor is 
also conducted by the FINA where she serves to provide a technical support to the court.48 
Besides the debtor, the judge and the creditors who form a special committee which 
represents the bodies of the bankruptcy proceedings, an important role is that of the 
bankruptcy commissioner. The bankruptcy commissioner represents a body often 
described as the most important one in the bankruptcy proceedings,49 for it could be said 
that the bankruptcy commissioner represents some kind of “prosecutor” and “guarantor” 
for al sides concerned as, on the one hand, he is responsible to present to the court the state 
of affairs of the company, whilst on the other hand he is responsible to overtake charge of 
all of the duties of the management and in this way he eventually becomes an official 
representative of the company during its bankruptcy phase. Recognizing the importance of 
this function, the Croatian legislator has foreseen certain conditions that one must meet, in 
order to be added to the official list of the bankruptcy commissioners that is lead by every 
commercial court separately. These conditions include certain level of education, 
experience and the successful sitting of an official exam administrated by the Ministry of 
                                                 
47 M. Dika, The procedure of Concluding the Pre-Bankruptcy Settlement [Postupak sklapanja predstečajne 
nagodbe], available at the site of Higher Commercial Court of Croatia at https://www.vts.hr, p. 7-8 <accessed 
July 7, 2019>. 
48 D. Bodul, Apology of the new Croatian Insolvency Law [Apologija novom hrvatskom insolvencijskom 
pravu], FIP - Financije i pravo, Vol. 4, No. 1, 2016, p. 234. 
49 D. Bodul, Apology of the new Croatian Insolvency Law [Apologija novom hrvatskom insolvencijskom 
pravu], FIP - Financije i pravo, Vol. 4, No. 1, 2016, p. 238-239. 
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Justice.50 The person of the bankruptcy commissioner is then chosen by the each time 
adjudicating judge through the method of random selection from the afore mentioned list, 
but creditors have a right to propose a specific person for this duty, should they wish to do 
so. Due to the high standards that bankruptcy commissioners need to meet in order to be 
able to step into the procedure, it is no surprise that they have a right to get an adequate 
remuneration for their work. However, it is exactly this remuneration together with other 
costs of the bankruptcy proceedings raises doubts about the efficiency of the bankruptcy 
proceedings. According to some defeating statistics, creditors manage to solve only 10,4% 
of their claim in the bankruptcy proceedings whereas the average costs of the proceedings 
reach 15% of the claim value. In addition, there have been cases when the value of the 
company was assessed to several million of Croatian Kuna and whereby the creditors did 
not any remuneration at all from these assets whereas the commissioner regularly received 
his remuneration and was also entitled to file for extra costs with no further specifications 
thereof.51 
The fiduciary duties of the commissioner and of other stakeholders in this process, 
are in detail contained in the Croatian Criminal Act. This act has a special chapter for 
economic crimes and lists several different crimes that can be attributed to parties in cases 
of misuse of the corporate bankruptcy proceedings. Amidst the list of crimes, one can find 
crimes such as  the deliberate causing of bankruptcy, the discrimination of creditors and 
the corruption during the bankruptcy proceedings.52 For some of these crimes, the law 
foresees as a punishment, an imprisonment of up to 10 years. Interestingly and usefully at 
the same time, for some cases the law foresees the possibility of exclusion from 
punishment, in case that all of the creditors manage to settle all of their claims before the 
verdict is reached.  
Furthermore, according to the article 239 of Croatian Companies Act, one can not 
become a company director if one has been sentenced for one of the above mentioned 
crimes, and this applies to a period of 5 years from the validity of the verdict. This sets up 
a good example on how different legal areas can, each with its own mechanisms, 
beautifully interact and ensure the right application of certain legal provisions. 
 
V. Minimization of Creditor and Shareholder Conflicts of Interest 
 
       In the zone of insolvency there are four specific conflicts of interest between 
shareholders and creditors. These specific conflicts of interest are divergent risk 
preferences, shareholder incentives to siphon assets out of the firm, liquidation preferences, 
and shareholders’ incentives for underinvestment. The USA legal, addresses three of these 
four conflicts of interest: a) first, by allowing managers to consider the interests of both 
shareholders and creditors, the impact of divergent risk preferences between these groups 
is mitigated; this further allows management to use its expertise to pursue the course of 
                                                 
50 For more detailed specification of these conditions, see article 77-82 of Croatian Insolvency Act (Official 
Gazette 71/15, 104/17). 
51 D. Sajter, Bankruptcy: Framework for fraud, or for creditor settlements and trust rehabilitation? [Stečaj: 
Okvir za malverzacije ili za namirenje vjerovnika i rehabilitaciju povjerenja?], Ekonomski pregled, Vol. 65, 
No. 4, 2014, p. 308, beside the case mentioned in this work, the author lists many other good examples of 
costs manipulation. 
52 For detailed description of these crimes and foreseen punishments, see articles 249-251 of Croatian 
Criminal Act (Official Gazette 125/11, 144/12, 56/15, 61/15, 101/17, 118/18). 
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action it feels is best for the corporation as an economic entity, and, moreover, the US 
strategy protects managers who enter transactions for the benefit of the firm in good faith; 
b) second, by granting creditors a standing so as  to sue directors for breaching the duty of 
loyalty once the company is insolvent, and in this way by  giving creditors the ability to 
protect themselves against shareholders siphoning assets out of the firm.  By removing a 
manager's incentive to undertake this socially undesirable action, this strategy minimizes 
the conflict of interest; c) third, by allowing the management to pursue the interests of 
creditors in the zone of insolvency, hence mitigating the impact of shareholder incentives 
for underinvestment.  Managers will be more likely to undertake transactions that will only 
benefit creditors since they will not lose the protection of the business judgment rule. 
It is notable that the legal response in the USA does not adequately address the 
divergent liquidation preferences between creditors and shareholders.  This leads to costly 
valuation litigation as creditors and shareholders squabble over whether a company should 
be liquidated or reorganized.  
The German legal strategy addresses two of these conflicts of interest by preventing 
management from undertaking risky transactions or siphoning out assets to 
shareholders.  By granting creditors standing to sue directors for grossly negligent business 
decisions in the zone of insolvency, managers will be unlikely to undertake excessively 
risky transactions.  Likewise, the risk that managers will siphon corporate assets out to 
shareholders is eliminated by barring such transactions in the zone of insolvency. However, 
Germany's legal response, which provides little management flexibility, does not minimize 
the conflicts of interest created by divergent liquidation preferences and shareholder 
incentives for underinvestment.  By forcing managers to initiate insolvency proceedings, 
shareholders will have any little say in whether the company liquidates or 
reorganizes.  Likewise, by barring most transactions, once a company enters the zone of 
insolvency, managers will be unlikely to undertake investments whose benefits only flow 
to creditors.53  
In Greece the position of the law and the basic reflection of the legislator, as far as 
shareholders and creditors are concerned, is geared towards a mechanism that serves the 
requirement of legal capital and its preservation.  The requirement exists, on the one hand,  
in company law for the generation of legal capital and its preservation; however, this 
having been said, there also exists the legal requirement, under insolvency law, to preserve 
the legal capital and not redistribute it, until the complete satisfaction of creditors in terms 
of the liquidation process. Directors are expected by law to assert careful management of 
the corporate assets, otherwise they carry internal liability for detrimental acts, 
mismanagement or excessive risk taking, in relation to the corporate assets, and are liable 
towards corporate creditors.54 The position can be criticized as similar to the one under 
German law. On the one hand the extremely high leveled net of protection of shareholders 
which also extends to creditors is a positive step towards the better enhancement of creditor 
protection, especially in case of insolvency. Moreover, corporate creditors are empowered 
with “weapons” of recourse towards corporate directors should they fall liable internally 
for jeopardizing or misusing the corporate assets. However, this rigid regime can be seen 
                                                 
53 J. Wood, Director’s Duties and Creditor Protections in the Zone of Insolvency: A Comparison of the USA, 
Germany and Japan, 26 Penn St. Int'l L. Rev. 139, 165. 
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as a halt towards the potential for directors to undertake excessively risky transactions, 
such as the undertaking of investments whose benefits will subsequently also positively 
affect the company creditors.55  
Under Croatian law, the wide scope of crimes related to corporate bankruptcy 
which are listed in the Croatian Criminal Act result in establishing the impression that the 
Croatian legislator tried, through their enactment, to tackle all the above listed conflicts of 
interests, in order to cover the possibility that they may not have been well managed by the 
extensive and detailed provisions of InsA 2015 or of the Croatian Company Act. However, 
in order to judge the effectiveness of this solution, one would need to conduct a research 
on the application of these criminal provisions in practice. It is widely acknowledged that 
it is too difficult to prove an intention of fraud in corporate crimes, and therefore it is rather 
certain that the statistics would not compliment the intentions of the legislator with regards 
to this matter.  
 
VI. Determining the Best Corporation Strategies 
 
       The policy of maximizing firm value is superior to maximizing creditor or shareholder 
value. Maximizing firm value theoretically maximizes value for all stakeholders, including 
creditors and shareholders. Moreover, it provides management more flexibility to 
determine the best strategy for the corporation. Thus, management can determine whether 
the best approach in a struggling company is a workout with creditors, reorganization, or 
liquidation. A strategy that maximizes the company’s value attempts to promote the 
welfare of all stakeholders.  Because the company value can be maximized through either 
liquidation or operation of the company as a going concern, this strategy provides the 
flexibility to choose the best outcome. In contrast, a strategy that requires the maximization 
of the company value to either shareholders or creditors at the expense of the other could 
lead to a socially undesirable outcome. Thus, strategies that allow for the company’s 
maximization are preferable to strategies that, as a policy matter, place one stakeholder's 
interests above the other's. 
       The US strategy gives directors the discretion to determine the best manner in which 
to operate the company in the zone of insolvency.  Directors will be insulated from 
personal liability if they discharge their fiduciary duties in good faith with the belief that 
the action taken is in the best interests of any stakeholder.  Accordingly, this gives 
directors, who have the best information about the company's financial position, the 
flexibility to pursue the course of action most likely to maximize the company’s value. 
       In contrast to the US strategy, the German strategy requires directors to initiate 
insolvency proceedings and limits directors' ability to enter transactions.  This strategy 
maximizes firm value for creditors at the expense of shareholders and other 
stakeholders.  Initiating insolvency proceedings immediately protects creditors by 
preventing the company from worsening its financial position.  Moreover, director liability 
to creditors for undertaking certain transactions reduces directors' willingness to undertake 
transactions that could benefit all stakeholders.  Like Germany's overall system of 
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corporate governance, this legal strategy is much more risk adverse than the US strategy.56 
  
 
VII. Creditor Protection Through Mandatory Disclosure  
 
 Creditor protection through mandatory disclosure has long been a highly debated 
issue among corporate lawyers. It is almost self-evident that those who lend money or 
advance credit can benefit from having reliable financial information pertaining to the 
corporation with whom they deal. This is true for any type of creditor, be it a bank, an 
institutional investor, a commercial creditor in supply industries, or the proverbial small 
tradesman rendering services to the corporation. It is, therefore, perfectly plausible that 
corporations provide their various creditors to a very large extent with information 
regarding their financial status. In addition, many jurisdictions require corporations to 
publicly disclose certain basic information before starting business or borrowing funds. 
Disclosure stands right in the center of the debate over the best and most efficient ways to 
organize company activities vis-à-vis shareholders, creditors and other market participants. 
Regulators are in the process of addressing whether their domestic disclosure rules are 
rigorous enough in the light of the problems and implications thrown up by corporate 
collapses and the risks associated with inadequate disclosure. Investor confidence in the 
capital market, is an overriding aim of disclosure and investor protection, as well as market 
protection, are subsidiary aims of mandating disclosure.. Mandating disclosure reduces the 
cost of capital, benefits market price accuracy and hence enforces market efficiency. At the 
center of the law and economics debate, over disclosure as a regulatory tool, stands the 
question whether and to what extent the mere dissemination of issuer information should 
be mandatory and managed by public rules or left to market forces and the incentives given 
to companies and other suppliers of information to provide adequate disclosure.57  
 Mandatory disclosure in the context of the creditors protection is not solely a 
responsibility of the corporate debtor and is not only related to the business of the 
corporation. The Croatian example of unjustified costs in the bankruptcy proceedings 
shows, in the best way, how important it is to have transparency abided with for the benefit 
of all the participants, especially bankruptcy commissioners, throughout the whole 
procedure.58 
   
 
VIII. Conclusions  
 
 One of the major issues discussed between the common law and continental law 
jurisdictions is the legitimacy of legal capital requirements as an ex ante means to protect 
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creditors. In contrast, the common law world makes use of an ex post approach by assigning 
duties to directors to respect creditors interests in the vicinity of insolvency. 
 There are mixed views about the efficiency of legal intervention to protect 
creditors of corporate enterprises. On the one hand, it seems that little legal intervention is 
needed to protect “adjusting creditors,” who can assess credit risk, contract for their own 
protection, and demand compensation for any residual risk that they choose to bear, 
however the question arises whether the law sufficiently protects “non-adjusting creditors”, 
especially tort creditors who cannot demand compensation ex ante for the credit risks that 
they bear involuntarily.59 It is not at all obvious that any ex ante protections are necessary 
or advisable, except for the baseline legal protection against fraud. However, to the extent 
that the law does prescribe ex ante terms in agreements between adjusting creditors and 
corporations, the assumption of a savvy contractor, strongly suggests that, these terms 
should be cast as default provisions that the parties can waive, and, secondly, that they 
should be designed to reduce transaction costs between corporate debtors and creditors, or 
overcome collective action problems that prevent dispersed creditors from reaching 
mutually beneficial agreements.  
 Modern commentators urge for a wider application of ex post protection of 
creditors through responsibility provisions. Ex post, i.e. after a contract has been executed, 
there is arguably more room for legal intervention on behalf of the voluntary creditors of 
corporate debtors to offset the risk of midstream opportunism. All of the ex post creditor 
remedies, let us conclude that both shareholders and managers have a strong incentive to 
remove value from creditors, in the vicinity of insolvency. Moreover, shareholders and 
managers are motivated to make poor decisions and undertake inefficient projects in these 
circumstances, precisely because they no longer bear the downside costs.  As creditors’ 
contractual remedies no longer work, when shareholders are in their “final period”, they 
have nothing left to lose by shifting value from corporate creditors because there is nothing 
left in the corporate treasury. In this case, civil damages are no longer an effective incentive 
for the debtor. However, civil damages against third-party gatekeepers with external pools 
of assets remain possible, whether these parties are directors,60 shareholders,61 or creditors 
and other third parties.62   
Convergence between the company law systems of the US and Europe still seems 
to have some way to go, in the realm of creditors’ protection, although the debt financiers’ 
reliance on contractual covenants means that the gap is narrower than the one that might 
be suggested by a glance at any company law statute book. Yet, even if the legal regimes 
are still some way apart, this is not necessarily negative. In other words, merely the fact 
that the approach in one region is different to that adopted elsewhere, does not constitute a 
sufficient reason to change it. Diversity matters, if it results in the delivery of different 
levels of creditors’ protection and not if it may result in being a source of complexity. 
Diversity also matters, if it means that certain economically worthwhile transactions are 
possible in some jurisdictions or regions, but not in others because of legal impediments or 
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if such transactions are more costly to execute, because navigating the legal maze is a more 
complex task. Hence, where the general economic well-being of society is losing out 
because of differences in regulatory strategies, policy-makers need to pay attention.63 
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